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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this paper is to describe a security scheme for 
a special-purpose resource-sharing system for networked 
computers.  The scheme makes use of cryptographic constructs 
called coupons, issued by a central authority, and 
representing the right to use a certain amount of resources on 
a specified machine.  The security scheme is described in 
detail, and an analysis of its security is also given. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of the scheme described here is to provide 
security for a special-purpose resource allocation scheme.  We 
suppose that, in a network of computers, two conditions exist: 
- spare resources are available, i.e. there exist computers 
on the network which do not use all their available CPU 
time. 
- jobs exist which require more computational effort than 
can be provided by a single machine in a reasonable amount 
of time. 
We then suppose that the owners of the under-used machines are 
willing for their unused resources to be utilised by other 
users with resource shortages, as long as these other users 
are appropriately authorised. 
 
In this paper we describe a scheme for providing such 
authorisation information.  This system uses the notion of a 
broker, who keeps details of all machines with spare 
resources, and allocates these resources to other users who 
need them.  This broker must be trusted by all the entities 
within the network which is serves.  We suppose that the 
computers on the network may be either users or suppliers of 
resources (or both).  A supplier makes the offer of unused 
capacity to the broker.  The broker then allocates these 
resources to users who request them from the broker. 
 
The protocol described below bears some resemblances to the 
Kerberos authentication protocol described by Steiner et al., 
[11].  However there are a number of significant differences.  
From a cryptographic point of view the most significant is 
that, unlike Kerberos, the protocol described here is 
independent of time-stamps, and hence does not rely on 
synchronised clocks.  In addition, within its designed 
application it introduces no additional messages, and hence 
its overheads on the underlying communications system are very 
low. 
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2.  THE PROTOCOL 
 
2.1  Notation and assumptions 
 
The solution described in this paper relies on the use of 
conventional (symmetric) cryptography, as typified by the DES 
block cipher algorithm, [1], [6].  We assume that each user 
and supplier in the network shares a secret key with the 
broker, and that this secret key corresponds to an algorithm 
capable of being used both for data encryption (for 
confidentiality) and for computation of Message Authentication 
Codes (MACs) for data integrity and authentication.  We denote 
the key shared by network entity E and the broker by K(E).  
Note that different versions of this key should be used for 
encryption and MAC computation; for example, the key could 
bit-wise exclusive or-ed with a fixed 'mask' (not all zeros or 
all ones) when used for MAC computation. 
 
We denote by 
EK[I] 
the encryption of the data I using key K, and we write 
MK[I] 
for the MAC computed on the data I using the key K.  The 
difference between these two concepts is that knowledge of 
EK[I] and K enables the recovery of I after the application of 
the appropriate decryption function, whereas MK[I] is a short, 
fixed length 'checksum' enabling deliberate or accidental 
modifications to data to be detected. 
 
An example of a suitable algorithm is provided by the DES (or, 
for that matter, any other block cipher algorithm).  Data 
encryption could be achieved by using DES in the standardised 
Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode, [2], [7], [8], and the MAC 
computation could again be based on DES in CBC mode; see, for 
example, [3], [4], [9]. 
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2.2  Resource tickets and their management 
 
Fundamental to the operation of the proposed system is the 
list of information on available resources kept by the broker.  
This list consists of a series of tickets, issued by resource 
suppliers on the network.  Each ticket contains the following 
three items of information:  the name of the supplier, a 
supplier serial number and a value parameter (giving an 
indication of the amount of resources being offered).  This 
value parameter may, for example, indicate an upper limit on 
CPU time, the type of processor involved and/or an upper limit 
on available RAM; the precise use of this parameter is beyond 
the scope of this paper and will, in any case, be very 
dependent on the particular implementation of this scheme. 
 
Each supplier will generate one or more of these tickets 
(possible of varying values) and send them to the broker in 
protected form.  As and when the tickets are eventually used 
(as we describe below), and as further unused resources become 
available, so the supplier generates more tickets and supplies 
them to the broker.  Serial numbers are allocated by the 
supplier, and it is important that the supplier ensures:  (a) 
that no two tickets with the same serial number are issued, 
and (b) that a record is kept of the serial numbers of 
outstanding (i.e. unused) tickets.  This is necessary in order 
to prevent re-use of old tickets. 
 
More formally, a ticket issued by supplier S has the form: 
( S, N, Vt ) 
where N is the serial number, Vt is the value and the use of 
commas denotes concatenation of data.  The three items of 
information within the ticket are precisely the items of 
information stored within the broker.  When the ticket is 
shipped from the supplier to the broker it has the form: 
( S, N, Vt, MK(S)[ S, N, Vt ] ) 
i.e. a MAC on all the data within the ticket is appended to 
the end of the ticket.  This MAC is computed using the key 
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shared by S and the broker.  The use of this MAC enables the 
broker to check the validity of the ticket. 
 
Before proceeding we consider the deletion of stored tickets.  
As we described above, lists of tickets will need to be stored 
both by ticket suppliers and the broker.  The broker deletes a 
ticket once it has been allocated to a particular user (as 
described in 2.3 below).  The ticket supplier deletes a ticket 
when a user wishes to use the resources specified in it (see 
2.4 below).  However, in certain circumstances, neither of 
these types of event will occur.  For example, the broker may 
never issue a ticket because of a shortage of users, and a 
user may not need to use a resource requested from a broker, 
and hence the supplier will never get a request for resources 
corresponding to one of its stored tickets. 
 
For this reason both the broker and the supplier will 
automatically delete tickets from their stores after a 
specified time interval (depending on the type of network 
involved).  At worst this will have the effect of meaning 
that, occasionally, messages from users to suppliers will be 
rejected because the corresponding tickets have expired and 
been discarded.  To minimise the probability of this occurring 
it is probably wise for the broker to keep tickets for a 
shorter time than the supplier. 
 
In many applications it may be desirable for suppliers of 
tickets to specify the lifetime of their tickets.  Details of 
how this may be achieved with only a small modification to the 
basic protocol are given in 4.3 below. 
 
 
2.3  Resource requests and coupons 
 
We now consider how users request resources from the broker.  
Suppose user U wishes to make use of spare resources on the 
network.  U issues a request to the broker, which contains the 
following two items of information:  the name of the user and 
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a value parameter, Vr, giving an indication of the amount of 
resources required.  As with the value parameter in supplier 
tickets, the precise nature of the request value parameter is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  These requests are sent in 
protected form as follows: 
( U, Vr, MK(U)[ U, Vr ] ) 
i.e. a MAC on all the data within the request is appended to 
the end of the request.  This MAC is computed using the key 
shared by U and the broker.  The use of this MAC enables the 
broker to check the validity of the request. 
 
On receipt of a request (given that the MAC check proves it to 
be valid) the broker will compare it with the outstanding 
tickets, and decide which of the tickets are to be allocated 
to the requesting user.  This will be done using a process 
which might take into account the following:  the privileges 
of the requesting user, the size of the value in the request 
and the number and values of the outstanding tickets. 
 
For each ticket allocated to the requesting user, a coupon 
message is generated and sent (in protected form) to the 
requesting user.  If the ticket being allocated to user U has 
the form: 
( S, N, Vt ) 
then the corresponding coupon message has the form: 
( S, N, Vt, U, MK(S)[ S,N,Vt,U,SK ], MK(U)[ S,N,Vt,U,SK ] ) 
  ( EK(U)[ SK ] ), 
  ( EK(S)[ SK ] ) 
 
The coupon itself is the first part of the message, namely: 
( S, N, Vt, U, MK(S)[ S,N,Vt,U,SK ], MK(U)[ S,N,Vt,U,SK ] ) 
where SK is a session key randomly generated by the broker and 
unique to each coupon.  Also sent with the coupon are:  a copy 
of the session key, SK, encrypted under the secret key shared 
by the user and the broker: 
( EK(U)[ SK ] ) 
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and a copy of the session key, SK, encrypted under the secret 
key shared by the ticket supplier and the broker: 
( EK(S)[ SK ] ) 
 
When the broker sends such a coupon, the corresponding ticket 
is deleted from its list.  For each coupon (and accompanying 
keys) received by the user, the following procedure is 
followed: 
- the copy of the session key SK encrypted under K(U) is 
decrypted and SK is recovered. 
- the appropriate MAC on the coupon is then checked using 
K(U) and the recovered value of SK. 
- if the MAC authenticates the coupon, then the coupon is 
stored ready for use, together with two other pieces of 
information:  the session key for the coupon (SK), and the 
session key encrypted under the supplier's secret key (as 
provided by the broker): 
( EK(S)[ SK ] ). 
 
 
2.4  Resource supply 
 
When the user receives the coupons from the broker, it is then 
up to the user to divide the task to be performed into 
suitable pieces corresponding to the values in the coupons.  
We now consider the process followed when a user wishes to use 
a coupon. 
 
The user, U, sends the coupon to the named supplier, S, 
(omitting the MAC computed using K(U) as this is of no use to 
S), together with two other pieces of information: 
- first, U also sends S a copy of the session key for the 
coupon encrypted under S's secret key (as provided by the 
broker): 
( EK(S)[ SK ] ). 
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- second, U sends all the necessary information about the 
task U wishes S to perform (probably including all the 
necessary executable code) authenticated using SK, i.e. if 
the task information is T then U sends S: 
( T, MSK[ T ] ). 
U also stores information about the particular task T, 
together with the values S and N, so that, when the results of 
performing T are returned to U by S, they can be matched to T. 
 
When S receives the coupon and the associated task 
information, S follows the procedure below: 
- the copy of the session key SK encrypted under K(S) is 
decrypted and SK is recovered. 
- the MAC on the coupon is checked using K(S) and the 
recovered value of SK. 
- the MAC on the task T is checked using SK. 
- if the MACs authenticate the coupon and the task to be 
performed, and the serial number N corresponds to an 
unredeemed serial number stored within S, then the task T 
is executed. 
- the ticket serial number, N, in this request is deleted 
from the list of outstanding tickets. 
 
When the given task has terminated, the results of performing 
the task are returned to U in a protected form.  More 
specifically, if R represents the results of performing the 
task T, then S returns to U the following: 
( R, S, N, MSK[ R, S, N ] ) 
where the name of S and the serial number N identify uniquely 
to U which task T these results correspond to.  This completes 
the description of the system's operation. 
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3.  ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL 
 
A system such as the one described in the above section may be 
subject to a variety of attacks by unauthorised third parties 
wishing to misappropriate resources.  We consider some of 
these attacks, and examine how the system resists them. 
 
Before proceeding note that the system described does not 
attempt to provide any confidentiality services for the tasks 
distributed around the network.  Rather, the scheme is 
designed to protect suppliers against misappropriation of 
their resources.  However, if they were ever required, 
confidentiality mechanisms could probably be added to the 
above protocol without too much difficulty. 
 
 
3.1  Replay attacks 
 
Every message in the protocol described above involves the use 
of authentication checks (MACs) computed using secret keys.  
Therefore, given the MAC algorithm is sound, construction by 
unauthorised users of completely spurious messages is 
impossible unless keys become compromised (we discuss this 
latter possibility in 3.2 below).  Thus, apart from key 
compromise, the only possible attacks involve some form of 
replay. 
 
We now examine in turn the effects of replaying each type of 
message in the system.  There are essentially five types of 
message in the above system:  tickets sent from S to the 
broker, requests sent from U to the broker, coupons sent from 
the broker to U, coupons sent from U to S and results sent 
from S to U. 
 
When transmitted from S to the broker, a ticket has the form: 
( S, N, Vt, MK(S)[ S, N, Vt ] ) 
and all the data in the ticket is protected by a single MAC.  
Therefore, in this case the only possibility is to replay the 
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message unchanged.  If such a replay occurs, all that will 
happen is that the broker will store a duplicate ticket, and 
possibly issue a duplicate coupon to an unsuspecting user.  If 
this does occur the only harmful end result is that one of the 
two recipients of the duplicated coupon will have their 
request refused by the supplier because the ticket has already 
been used.  This is a minor problem and does not breach the 
security of the system. 
 
When transmitted from U to the broker, a request has the form: 
( U, Vr, MK(U)[ U, Vr ] ) 
and all the data in the request is protected by a single MAC.  
Therefore, as before, the only possibility is to replay the 
message unchanged.  The end result will be that U will be 
given coupons for which U has no real use, and perhaps some of 
these coupons will be wasted.  A persistent attacker of the 
system could repeatedly do this, with the aim of diverting all 
the coupons to one user and thereby preventing their 
allocation to genuine users.  The obvious way to alleviate the 
effects of such an attack is to restrict the percentage of 
coupons which may be allocated to any one user.  However, the 
main thing to note is that this attack would not compromise 
the basic integrity of the system, since no resources would be 
allocated to unauthorised users.  It has to be recognised that 
'denial of service' attacks can always be launched against 
such systems, in the extreme simply by disrupting the 
communications between end users of the network. 
 
When transmitted from the broker to U, a coupon message has 
the form: 
( S, N, Vt, U, MK(S)[ S,N,Vt,U,SK ], MK(U)[ S,N,Vt,U,SK ] ) 
  ( EK(U)[ SK ] ), 
  ( EK(S)[ SK ] ) 
This message has three distinct parts; however all three parts 
are 'bound together' by the value of SK, which is unique to 
this particular coupon.  Therefore, the only possibility is to 
replay the message unchanged.  The end result of such a replay 
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will be that U ends up with two copies of the same coupon; if 
U tries to use both of them then the second will be rejected 
by the supplier S.  This again does not represent a major 
hazard to the security of the system, since such events are 
bound to occasionally occur because of the automatic deletion 
of tickets by suppliers. 
 
When transmitted from U to S, a coupon message has the form: 
( S, N, Vt, U, MK(S)[ S, N, Vt, U, SK ] ), 
  ( T, MSK[ T ] ), 
  ( EK(S)[ SK ] ) 
This message has three distinct parts; however, just as before 
all three parts are 'bound together' by the value of SK, which 
is unique to this particular coupon.  Therefore, the only 
possibility is to replay the message unchanged.  The end 
result of such a replay will be for S to receive two copies of 
the same coupon from U.  The second will be rejected by the 
supplier S, and so this attack again does not represent a 
major hazard to the security of the system. 
 
When transmitted from S to U, a results message has the form: 
( R, S, N, MSK[ R, S, N ] ) 
and all the data in the message is protected by a single MAC.  
Therefore, in this case the only possibility is to replay the 
message unchanged.  This will mean that U gets two copies of 
the results of performing the requested task.  The second will 
be ignored since the two copies will be identified as such by 
the repetition of N (the serial number). 
 
 
3.2  Deletion of messages 
 
The only obvious effect of deleting any of the messages in 
transit is to prevent the use of a ticket issued by a 
supplier, S.  S will then be left with an unused ticket in its 
list.  This could happen anyway if a user U never cashes in a 
coupon issued by the broker.  The simplest solution to the 
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problem of accumulating unclaimed resource tickets is for all 
suppliers to discard unused tickets within a certain time 
interval of their issue, as described in 2.2 above. 
 
 
3.3  Use of cryptanalysed session keys 
 
It will be apparent that the protocol described above bears 
many similarities to the protocol described in Needham and 
Schroeder, [10].  Unfortunately, this latter protocol is 
vulnerable to a certain special kind of replay attack if the 
confidentiality of a session key is ever compromised; see, for 
example, [5]. 
 
The main difference between the protocol described here and 
the Needham/Schroeder protocol is the use of serial numbers, 
which prevent re-use of coupons.  This is a great advantage 
since it also prevents the kind of attack possible on the 
Needham/Schroeder protocol.  We now describe the potential 
attack in a little more detail. 
 
Suppose that an interceptor, C say, of a coupon has, by some 
means, been able to discover the session key, SK, used to 
authenticate the coupon.  If the interceptor wishes to use 
this information to steal resources from the supplier of the 
corresponding ticket, then a message of the form: 
( S, N, Vt, U, MK(S)[ S, N, Vt, U, SK ] ), 
  ( T', MSK[ T' ] ), 
  ( EK(S)[ SK ] ) 
must be constructed and sent to S, where T' is the task that C 
wishes S to perform. 
 
The first and third parts of such a message can never be 
computed by C, since constructing them requires knowledge of 
the key K(S) which we must assume remains secure; of course, 
if this key was compromised then the entire system would be 
rendered insecure.  Hence the only option for C is to copy 
these two parts from an observed message and forge the middle 
RESOURCE SHARING SECURITY 
Page 14 
part (containing T').  This would work (with C impersonating 
U) but it would only work once, since S will delete the ticket 
with serial number N from its list the first time such a 
message is received. 
 
In summary, compromise of the session key SK belonging to a 
ticket will only compromise the security of the resources 
allocated to that ticket, and will not allow any other 
resources to be stolen.  This is as much as one could expect 
from a system of this type. 
 
 
3.4  User attacks 
 
In our discussion above we have considered the case where an 
unauthorised third party wishes to steal resources from a 
supplier.  We conclude this analysis by considering the case 
where a valid user wishes to try and obtain more resources 
than are allocated by the broker. 
 
As in 3.3 above, such a user U must send a message of the 
following form to a supplier S: 
( S, N, Vt, U, MK(S)[ S, N, Vt, U, SK ] ), 
  ( T', MSK[ T' ] ), 
  ( EK(S)[ SK ] ) 
However, user U is in no better a position than the third 
party C described in 3.3 above to forge the first or third 
parts of such a message.  It is therefore not possible for a 
user to obtain resources not allocated to it (unless the 
cryptographic functions used are insecure or secret keys are 
compromised). 
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4.  POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS 
 
There are many ways in which the above protocol could be 
extended to provide additional facilities.  We consider three 
such extensions here. 
 
 
4.1  Multiple results messages 
 
The protocol described above allows for the resource supplier, 
S, to return a single results message to the user, U.  In some 
circumstances (particularly if the task being undertaken by S 
is a long one) it would be desirable to allow S to return 
intermediate results messages. 
 
Currently the defined protocol will only allow the 
transmission of one such results message - all subsequent 
messages will be rejected as replays.  To modify the protocol 
to allow multiple results message requires S and U to store 
and use an additional serial number, PN say.  The form of the 
results message will then be 
( R, S, N, PN, MSK[ R, S, N, PN ] ) 
In the first results message PN is set to 1, and is then 
incremented for each subsequent results message.  U will only 
accept these messages if the new value of PN is strictly 
larger than the previously received value for this particular 
value of N.  The use of this serial number will prevent replay 
attacks. 
 
 
4.2  Splitting tickets 
 
When the broker receives a ticket from a supplier S, the value 
in the ticket may be large compared with the values of coupon 
the broker is being requested to issue.  In such circumstances 
it would be desirable if the broker could divide the ticket 
into two or more parts and issue coupons whose values sum to 
the value of the ticket.  One way in which this might be 
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achieved securely is as follows. 
 
When the broker issues a coupon, (representing part of the 
value of the ticket issued by supplier S with serial number N 
and value Vt), an additional serial number CN is included.  
The number CN is initially set to 1, and subsequently 
incremented every time a new coupon is issued representing 
part of the same ticket.  The issued coupon will then have the 
form: 
( S,N,CN,Vc,U, MK(S)[S,N,CN,Vc,U,SK], MK(U)[S,N,CN,Vc,U,SK] ) 
where Vc represents the value of the coupon and is not more 
than the value given to the issued ticket (Vt).  The broker 
must ensure that the sum of the coupon values Vc issued 
against a ticket never exceed the value of the ticket (i.e. 
Vt). 
 
When U receives a coupon and uses it to issue a request, U not 
only stores information about the task T and the values S and 
N, but also stores the value CN.  This value is used to help 
match received results messages against stored requests.  When 
U requests S to perform a task, the communication is just as 
described in 2.4 above, except that the coupon shipped from U 
to S now contains the value Vc. 
 
The ticket supplier, S, is also required to store additional 
state information, namely:  the initial value of the ticket 
Vt, the value so far consumed (i.e. the sum of the values Vc 
of the coupons so far received bearing the serial number of 
the ticket), and the values for the serial numbers CN so far 
received.  When a coupon is received two additional checks are 
performed:  the coupon number CN is checked against the stored 
values for this N to detect replays, and the value on the 
coupon, Vc, is added to the value so far consumed, and a check 
is made to see that the total value does not exceed the value 
originally assigned to this serial number N. 
 
Finally note that the only other change to transmitted 
messages is in the form of the results message, which also 
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includes the new serial number CN, and has the form: 
( R, S, N, CN, MSK[ R, S, N, CN ] ) 
 
 
4.3  Limiting the life of tickets 
 
The automatic expiry of tickets was discussed in 2.2 above.  
However, as mentioned in 2.2, in some circumstances different 
suppliers may wish to assign different (shorter) life-times to 
their tickets.  For example a supplier may have resources 
available for a strictly limited period of time, and may wish 
to specify that, after the expiry of this time period, the 
ticket should not be issued. 
 
Of course, one simple strategy would be for suppliers to 
delete the tickets themselves once the resources have ceased 
to be available, regardless of the fact that the broker might 
still issue a corresponding coupon to a user.  All that would 
happen is that the user's request for resources would be 
denied.  However, a more efficient solution might be to 
include a life-time interval inside each ticket.  The general 
form of a ticket would then be: 
( S, N, Vt, T ) 
where T indicates the length of time that the ticket should be 
kept by the broker.  If the ticket remains unused after time T 
has elapsed, it is automatically deleted by the broker.  
Suppliers would normally keep tickets for a slightly longer 
time interval (as previously discussed). 
 
One advantage of this scheme is that it does not require 
synchronised clocks in order to operate correctly.  All it 
requires is that the broker's and supplier's clocks run at 
roughly the same rate (a very reasonable requirement). 
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